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Abstract 
This working paper analyses investment by Russian firms in the four Visegrád countries, their 
motivations and ownership advantages, based mostly on the eclectic paradigm. Beside 
statistical data, we rely on case studies to present the profile of the most important Russian 
investors in each host country. The Visegrád countries have attracted less Russian investment 
than their economic importance would warrant, due to various factors, most notably the joint 
effects of reticence in host countries and firm strategies that do not necessarily see the 
subregion as a major priority. Most of the Russian investment examined is market, and to a 
lesser extent, resource seeking, concentrated in the hydrocarbons, steel and nuclear energy 
industries, often dominated by state-owned firms. Some innovative private Russian companies, 
with features similar to developed-country multinationals, can also be identified with market- 
as well as efficiency-seeking investment. Extant investment theories with the exception of the 
eclectic paradigm fall short of explaining Russian investment. This paper suggests that further 
analysis is needed on the role of the home country in stimulating outward investment and 
directing it to specific locations. 
JEL: D22, F23, M16 
Keywords: foreign direct investment, multinational enterprises, Central Europe, Russia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
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Introduction: context and methodology 
The recent rise of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from emerging 
economies can be best explained by the fast expansion of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) from a handful of leading countries. Among those top countries, Russia has been 
particularly dynamic: it has entered permanently the club of the world’s 20 largest 
sources of OFDI stock, and is currently among the top 10 countries of the world in terms 
of OFDI flows (UNCTAD, 2014).2 Moreover, in the 2013 Forbes List of 2000 Global 
Companies, there were already 30 Russian firms.3 However, only a few large MNEs are 
responsible for the overwhelming majority of this outward expansion, based in natural 
resources and in selected services (banking, telecommunications, see Kalotay & 
Sulstarova, 2010). While these companies have shown global ambitions from the outset, 
many of them remained regional MNEs, concentrating their foreign assets in Europe and 
Central Asia (Kuznetsov, 2013). Moreover, there is a clear regional refocusing of Russian 
OFDI since the onset of the global crisis, targeting the East Central European region 
(including the Visegrád countries) more than before. 
The Visegrád countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) could indeed 
be major targets for the expansion of Russian MNEs. Poland has a common border with 
Russia, while the other three countries are geographically close. Even more important is 
the common economic heritage Russia and the Visegrád countries share, because in the 
period between 1949 and 1991, when they were members of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA), they were involved in an almost exclusive trade 
partnership with each other – with a clear Soviet leadership. The dominance of political 
factors coupled with a lack microeconomic roots of that economic cooperation resulted 
in the quick dissolution of the Council – already in 1991 – in the aftermath of a radical 
change in the global economic landscape. Since then, the Visegrád countries (together 
                                                 
2 Direct investment from Russia received a great boost during the 2000’s, first in 2003, and then in 2006 
(CBR, 2014a). In 2008, Russian FDI outflows reached a record high of $55.7 billion, but the crisis was 
strongly reflected in the figures from the third quarter of 2008 and onwards, leading to a major year-on-
year decline of 22 per cent in 2009. However, FDI outflows were again at record highs of $66.9 billion 
and $86.7 billion in 2011 and 2013, respectively, placing Russia in the top 5 FDI providers in 2013. Since 
2009, except for 2012, FDI outflows have again been exceeding inflows (Weiner, 2011; CBR, 2014a; 
UNCTAD, 2014). Foreign direct investment by Russian business was less affected by the crisis than 
foreign direct investment planned and undertaken in Russia. 
3http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#page:1_sort:0_direction:asc_search:_filter:All%20industries_fil
ter:Russia_filter:All%20states. 
- 3 - 
Kálmán Kalotay, Andrea Éltető, Magdolna Sass, Csaba Weiner / Russian capital in the 
Visegrád countries 
 
with other former CMEA members) reoriented their foreign trade towards developed 
countries, first of all towards the European Union (EU), reducing Russia’s share to 
negligible, except in oil and gas imports. However, one has to consider that if Russian 
firms wish to re-establish business links with former European CMEA countries 
(including East Germany) capitalizing on the tradition of more than four decades of 
cooperation, they find the Visegrád countries right in the middle of that area, 
concentrating about 60% of the population; they are also the countries through which 
the strategic Friendship Pipeline4 and gas pipelines flow. If the aim of Russian firms is to 
establish themselves in the industrial heartland of Europe, the main East–West 
transport corridors they can use pass through the Visegrád countries.5 These countries 
could therefore become the most natural entrepôt for all firms going West, especially if 
one considers that they are already part of the EU customs union, and also offer the 
benefit of free movement of people within the Schengen Zone. As the data presented in a 
subsequent section show a low share of Russian investment in the Visegrád countries, 
one can refer to missed business opportunities.6 
Despite relative familiarity with Russian partners, the reaction of politicians and 
public opinion in the Visegrád countries to the arrival of Russian firms has not always 
been positive. Part of the misgivings may be explained by a general “they are not us” 
attitude, which can be observed in any host country, even the United States (Tyson, 
1991). Furthermore, the negative experience of the Soviet military occupation and the 
inefficient functioning of the planned economic system imposed on these countries by 
the Soviet leadership between 1945 and 1989 add to these fears.  However, part of the 
local resistance to Russian firms may stem from fears derived from the alleged 
misbehaviour of those firms in foreign countries. Some Russian MNEs are perceived as a 
potential threat on the assumption that they may be a tool of Russia’s leaders to regain 
                                                 
4 It is the world’s longest oil pipeline carrying oil on around 4,000 kilometres from Russia to points in 
Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Germany. 
5 Corridor III linking the EU capital Brussels to the East passes via the Polish cities of Wrocław, Katowice 
and Kraków, before going to Kiev (the latter linked to Moscow and St Petersburg via Corridor IX). 
Corridor V linking Northern Italy to the East passes via the Hungarian capital Budapest, then goes to 
Uzhhorod in Ukraine, to link up with Kiev, and then Russia. And perhaps the most important of all links 
is the Corridor II, starting from Berlin, passing via the Polish cities of Poznań and Warsaw, then in the 
East continuing to Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod via the Belarus capital Minsk. 
6 This low share cannot be explained by the current Crimean/Ukrainian crisis for at least two reasons: 
because this low share characterized the pre-crisis period, too; and because the crisis affects all host 
countries. 
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political and economic hegemony in the former CMEA region. Additionally questions can 
be raised about the quality of certain parts of Russian OFDI. One problem is an alleged 
link with illegal or unethical behaviour (Ledayeva, 2013). The use of transhipment 
countries to hide the origin of the investor can further exacerbate that perception. It has 
to be recalled that, in 2012, more than half of the country’s OFDI stock had transited via 
offshore financial centres, more than twice as much as OFDI directly targeting the 
European Union (EU)-28 (Figure 1). 
Our methodological approach is twofold. First, we analyse available macro data on 
Russian FDI in the four Visegrád countries. Available Russian and host country flow and 
stock data are examined for the period 2004–2012, using sources of balance of 
payments of the Visegrád countries and other available data sources. We show 
discrepancies between the data sets and present anecdotal evidence for the inclination 
of Russian investor companies to use third countries as intermediaries in their foreign 
investment projects realised in the Visegrád countries (see e.g. Kuznetsov, 2013). 
Figure 1. Russia’s OFDI stock by main groups of countries, end 2012 
Billions of dollars 
Other Europe; 22
Former Soviet 
Union minus Baltics; 
15
Other economies; 
22
EU-28 minus 
offshore financial 
centres; 115
Offshore financial 
centres; 232
 
Source: Authors’ calculation, based on Bank of Russia data. 
From the intermediary country, capital either goes back to Russia or lands in a third 
country – as “non-Russian” investment. As a result, raw data can provide a misleading 
picture about the geographical and the sectoral composition of Russian OFDI, a 
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distortion that only case studies can correct efficiently. Thus our second methodological 
approach is to apply case studies of Russian investment in the four countries analysed. 
This methodology permits us to get around the above-mentioned data problems that 
surround Russian OFDI. We observed the following characteristics of the top Russian 
subsidiaries in each Visegrád country: the main characteristics of the Russian investing 
company (name, industry, activity, employment, foreign expansion and its motivations, 
ownership structure with special attention to links to government), and those of the 
local subsidiary (time of entry, entry mode, Russian share, industry, transhipping or 
round tripping involved, main motivation of the investor, main changes in its operations 
after the acquisition). Moreover, we also include the analysis of cases of unsuccessful 
takeovers alongside the same characteristics. 
Our methodological approach has both its advantages and drawbacks. The above-
mentioned data problems surrounding Russian OFDI and its high concentration in terms 
of the number of investing companies clearly favour our approach. Differences between 
the four analysed countries and their economic relationship with Russia indicate the use 
of separate country studies. Furthermore, case studies are rich in detail and can provide 
important information concerning up till then neglected but important features. Case 
studies can be used as tests for the applicability of theories, which is one of our main 
aims in the case of Russian MNEs. On the other hand, case studies are not representative 
and provide limited scope for generalization (OECD, 2009). They are also criticized for 
being subjective (Gibbert et al., 2008). Our approach of multiple and comparable case 
studies, analysing the same list of characteristics of Russian subsidiaries in the four 
countries attempts to widen the scope for generalization. 
The paper is structured as follows: First, a brief summary of bilateral foreign direct 
investment (FDI) statistics is presented. This information is complemented – after a 
summary of the literature on Russian OFDI and MNEs – by case studies of Russian 
investment in the four selected countries. The subsequent section presents implications 
for extant OFDI and MNE theories. The last section concludes. 
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The place of Visegrád countries in OFDI from Russia: what statistics show 
As mentioned, FDI statistics are unable to capture the full complexities of Russian 
corporate actions. The main limitations are the following: 
• FDI measures only the equity-related activities of MNEs. Therefore, should Russian 
firms engage in non-equity modes of production in Visegrád countries (such as 
franchising, licensing, contract manufacturing, business process outsourcing etc.); 
FDI data would reflect reality in the field quite poorly. 
• FDI statistics on the countries of origin and destination always register the economy 
of residence of the immediate investor, not that of the final owner of the assets. Due 
to the presence of transhipment as a dominant form of OFDI, a large part of data may 
escape the radar screen of host countries which use only the traditional FDI 
statistics. 
As mentioned above, investment to offshore centres is often, at a later stage, further 
transhipped to a final target country, or round tripped back to Russia. This feature is not 
a unique characteristic of OFDI from Russia. Brazilian MNEs use offshore financial 
centres as transit points for their OFDI on an even larger scale (Kalotay, 2012). ). Even 
developed country multinationals try to optimize their taxes through techniques known 
as “Dutch sandwich” or “double Irish”, when they insert a Dutch or Irish affiliate in their 
foreign investment in third countries. In both cases, a difficulty arises from the fact that 
one loses track of the final destination of investment projects. One exception can be 
made with Cyprus due to its almost 100% reliance on Russian (and, to a lesser degree, 
related Azeri, Kazakh, Ukrainian) capital (Pelto et al., 2004; Kalotay, 2013). For that 
reason, we can use FDI from Cyprus as a more or less acceptable proxy for transhipped 
FDI from Russia. Unfortunately, the same rule cannot be applied to the British Virgin 
Islands, Luxembourg, Bahamas, Jersey etc. where Russian offshore capital is mixed with 
investment coming from other jurisdictions. 
The rest of Russian OFDI targets primarily the so called wider European space 
(Kuznetsov, 2013a), especially the EU member countries, followed by other Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. It has to be noted here that even in those locations, some of the 
transactions can be of transhipped nature, especially in the Netherlands and 
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Switzerland. Beside the group of tax heavens and wider Europe, the only sizeable target 
of Russian OFDI is the United States (Table 1). 
Table 1. Russia’s outward FDI stock by top 20 recipients and 
main groups of countries, end 2012 
Millions of dollars and percentages 
Item 
Value ($ 
million) 
Share in total 
(%) 
Total outward FDI stock 406 295 100.00 
Offshore financial centres 232 205 57.15 
Of which:   
Cyprus (1) 151 806 37.36 
British Virgin Islands (3) 46 649 11.48 
Luxembourg (7) 9 114 2.24 
Bahamas (10) 5 937 1.46 
Jersey (13) 5 124 1.26 
Saint Kitts and Nevis (14) 4 951 1.22 
Bermuda (17) 3 619 0.89 
   
EU-28 minus offshore financial 
centresa 114 725 28.24 
Of which:   
Netherlands (2) 64 632 15.91 
United Kingdom (6) 9 962 2.45 
Germany (8) 9 089 2.24 
Austria (9) 7 460 1.84 
Spain (16) 3 715 0.91 
France (18) 3 279 0.81 
Bulgaria (19) 2 835 0.70 
Ireland (20) 2 538 0.62 
   
Other Europe 22 052 5.43 
Of which:   
Switzerland (4) 11 965 2.94 
Turkey (11) 5 661 1.39 
   
Former Soviet Union minus Baltics 15 472 3.81 
Of which:   
Ukraine (12) 5 404 1.33 
Belarus (15) 3 790 0.93 
   
Other high-income countries 15 798  
Of which:   
United States (5) 10 662 2.62 
   
Other economies 6 043 1.49 
   
Source: Authors’ calculation, based on Bank of Russian data. 
e
 EU financial centres: Cyprus and Luxembourg. 
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According to Bank of Russia data, the four Visegrád countries accounted for less than 
1% of the OFDI stock at the end of 2012 (Table 2). Among these four countries, by far 
the Czech Republic was the most important destination of Russian capital invested 
directly. If we add the other seven economies of transition which are members of the EU 
(especially Bulgaria and Lithuania, in which the Russian stocks exceed $1 billion), the 
share in Russian OFDI still reaches only 2%. This has to be compared with the massive 
share of 37% represented by Cyprus. It has to be noted that in 2009 and 2010, Hungary 
was the largest recipient of Russian OFDI stock (Table 2). However, it was due to 
Surgutneftegaz’s acquisition of shares in the oil and gas company Mol (see below), which 
never resulted in an effective control, and ended up with the resale of that share to the 
Hungarian State. 
Table 2. Russia’s OFDI stock in Central and East European countries,a 2009, 2010, 2011 
and 2012 
Millions of dollars 
Ran-
kingb 
End 2009 End 2010 End 2011 End 2012 
Country Value Country Value Country Value Country Value 
1 Hungary 2 266 Hungary 2 230 Bulgaria 2 439 Bulgaria 2 835 
2 Bulgaria 1 586 Bulgaria 1 884 Serbia 1 488 Serbia 1 784 
3 Lithuania 1 380 Lithuania 1 420 Lithuania 1 444 Czech Rep. 1 585 
4 Montenegro 1 339 Czech Rep. 1 192 Czech Rep. 1 309 Lithuania 1 329 
5 Czech Rep. 1 336 Montenegro 896 Montenegro 935 Montenegro 1 108 
6 Poland 596 Bosnia and H. 678 Latvia 704 Latvia 879 
7 Estonia 589 Serbia 623 Bosnia and H. 561 Bosnia and H. 725 
8 Bosnia and H. 541 Poland 581 Poland 545 Poland 596 
9 Latvia 535 Latvia 473 Croatia 250 Croatia 318 
10 Serbia 394 Romania 258 Hungary 228 Estonia 267 
11 Croatia 206 Croatia 226 Estonia 220 Romania 138 
12 Romania 63 Estonia 149 Romania 147 Hungary 106 
13 Slovakia 48 Slovenia 59 Slovenia 64 Slovakia 78 
14 Slovenia 14 Slovakia 52 Slovakia 59 Slovenia 45 
15 Albania – Albania – Albania – TFYR Macedonia 1 
16 TFYR Macedonia – TFYR Macedonia – TFYR Macedonia – Albania – 
a
 Excluding the CIS and Georgia. 
b
 In descending order. 
Note: The Visegrád countries are highlighted in grey. 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on CBR (2014b). 
National data of the four Visegrád countries also suggest that Russia is not a major 
source of inward FDI (Table 3). The figures provided by these countries are fairly similar 
to, but, with some exceptions, somewhat lower than the mirror data obtained from 
Russia. In Hungary and Slovakia, the values of inward stock from Russia are negative, 
indicating that the Russian parent firms are net borrowers from their local affiliates in 
the deals directly registered from Russia. In the Czech Republic and Poland, the values 
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are positive but remain well below the 1% mark. As for Cyprus, that can be assumed as 
an important additional source of Russian capital, its share exceeds 3% in each of these 
countries except Hungary. These are all proofs of an apparently modest presence of 
Russian capital in the four Visegrád countries. As for the other seven transition 
economies which are EU members, the presence of Russian capital is more noticeable in 
the three Baltic States and Bulgaria, but similar to the Visegrád group in Croatia, 
Romania and Slovenia. 
Table 3. The place of Cyprus and Russia in the inward FDI stock of Visegrád countries 
and other new EU members, end 2012 
Millions of dollars and percentages 
  Total 
inward FDI 
stock 
Cyprus   Russia Russian 
mirror 
data 
Diffe-
rence 
  
Host country Value 
Share in 
total (%)   Value   
Share in total 
(%)   
Czech Republic 136 493 5 372 3.94  411  0.30 1 585 1 174  
Hungary 84 811 1 552 1.83  -127  … 106 233  
Poland 219 833 7 813 3.55  675  0.31 596 -79  
Slovakia 55 905 2 339 4.18  -352  … 78 430  
Visegrád total 497 041 17 077 3.44  606  0.12 2 365 1 759  
Bulgaria 49 318 2 703 5.48  2 296  4.66 2 835 539  
Croatiaa 33 324 231 0.69  257  0.77 318 61  
Estonia 19 382 551 2.84  691  3.56 267 -424  
Latvia 13 556 864 6.37  639  4.72 879 240  
Lithuania 16 033 491 3.06  762  4.75 1 329 567  
Romania 78 135 3 342 4.28  … b … 138 7 b 
Slovenia 15 494 204 1.32  62  0.40 45 -17  
Total of other new EU 
members 225 241 8 386 3.72   4 838   2.15 5 811 973   
Source: Authors’ calculation, based on national data. 
Note: Data are not strictly comparable across countries because of their differences in terms of deducting special 
purpose entities from their FDI data.  
a
 For Croatia, cumulative FDI inflows have been used. 
b
 Romania reports its inward FDI stock from Russia being less than €100 million, without specifying the amount. 
The difference with mirror data has been estimated as the value of Russian reports minus €99 million. 
The extant literature on Russian OFDI in a nutshell 
There is a growing body of literature that deals with OFDI from Russia and activities 
of Russian MNEs abroad but Visegrád countries as hosts have hardly been addressed. 
Most of the literature has been produced by a relatively small circle of academics. A 
common thread of these studies is that they attempt to explain why Russian firms are 
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investing abroad, and why their expansion is so quick. As will be highlighted in this 
summary, the number of studies explaining the selection of one location instead of 
another is relatively small. Their studies can be divided into five categories: (1) 
comprehensive overviews, in particular, by Finnish and Russian research institutes, 
including surveys that have jointly been conducted with the Columbia Center on 
Sustainable Investment; (2) regionally focused studies; (3) host-country-specific studies; 
(4) sectoral studies; and (5) company case studies (Table 4). 
Table 4. Summary of literature on Russian OFDI and MNEs, 1994–2014 
Overview Regional focus Country focus Sectoral focus Company focus 
Bulatov (1994, 1995 
& 1998), Vinslav et 
al. (1999), Liuhto & 
Jumpponen (2003), 
Vahtra & Liuhto 
(2004), Vahtra (2006 
& 2007), Kuznetsov 
(2007, 2010, 2011 & 
2013a), Kalotay 
(2005), Deloitte 
(2008), Skolkovo 
(2007 & 2008), 
IMEMO (2009 & 
2011), Panibratov & 
Kalotay (2009), 
Panibratov (2012 & 
2014) 
- CIS: Vahtra (2005), 
Libman & Kheifets 
(2006), Kuznetsov, 
Kvashnin & Gutnik 
(2013) 
- CIS & EU: 
Kuznetsov (2006) 
- Wider Europe: 
Kuznetsov (2013b) 
- CEE: Pelto, Vahtra 
& Liuhto (2004), 
Weiner (2006) 
- Baltic States: 
Kilvits, Purju & 
Pädam (2005) 
- Central Asia: 
Kuznetsov (2008) 
- West Africa: 
Degterev (2007) 
- Germany: Heinrich 
(2005) 
- Bulgaria: Zashev 
(2005) 
- Hungary: Weiner 
(2011 & 2013) 
- Poland: Liuhto 
(2002), Runiewicz 
(2005) 
- Latvia: Zashev 
(2005b) 
- Lithuania: Zashev 
(2004) 
- Ukraine: Blyakha 
(2009) 
- Belarus: 
Yeremeyeva (2009) 
- US: Kostyayev 
(2009) 
- Brazil: Latukha et 
al. (2011) 
- Southwestern 
Finland: Johansson 
(2006) 
- Mineral resources: 
Boyarko (2002) 
- Energy: Ehrstedt & 
Vahtra (2008) 
- Oil: Väätänen & 
Liuhto (2001) 
- ICT: Panibratov 
(2011) 
- Telecom: Lisitsyn et 
al. (2005) 
- Metals: 
Chetverikova (2009), 
Survillo & Sutyrin 
(2001) 
- Banking: Panibratov 
& Verba (2011) 
 
- Gazprom & Lukoil: 
Liuhto (2001) 
- Gazprom: Heinrich 
(2003) 
Source: Authors’ compilation, partly based on literature reviews carried out by Kuznetsov (2010) and Liuhto & 
Majuri (2014). 
The fast rise of Russian OFDI has been noted by various studies, including the 
paradox of outflows exceeding inflows in certain years, especially since the onset of the 
global crisis (Weiner, 2011; CBR, 2014a). According to Panibratov and Kalotay (2009), 
50 to 60 MNEs account for the bulk of Russian assets abroad, but despite this 
concentration, the total number of Russian firms investing abroad probably exceeds 
1,000. In contrast, by citing the work of Libman and Kheyfets (2006), Deloitte (2008) 
asserted that the total number of Russian companies controlling foreign assets was at 
least 5,000 in 2005. However, Kheyfets (2008) believed there might be 5,000–10,000 
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firms identified as MNEs according to the UNCTAD criteria, even if purely offshore 
companies engaged exclusively in financial transactions were omitted. 
Foreign assets of the top 20 Russian non-financial MNEs reached $111 billion at the 
end of 2011 (Kuznetsov, 2013a), still below their end-2008 peak level of $118 billion 
(IMEMO, 2009). The list is dominated by resource-based MNEs, i.e. oil and gas and 
metals companies with considerable exports, such as Lukoil, Gazprom, Evraz and Mechel 
(Kuznetsov, 2013a). In the 2000s, Russia’s MNEs based on natural resources managed to 
improve their financial positions through the big export revenues caused by high energy 
and commodity prices, and this allowed them to expand globally (Weiner, 2006). 
Russian metals giants suffered consequences of the crisis more severely than Russian oil 
and gas companies. However, Kuznetsov (2010) claims that during the crisis, there were 
only few large divestments of Russian MNEs. At the end of 2011, Europe and Central 
Asia accounted for about two-thirds of the foreign assets, while former Soviet Republics 
represented 28% of those of the top 20. Contrary to Bulgaria and Romania, the Visegrád 
countries are not among the leading EU host countries. The top 20 list covers both state-
controlled and private MNEs. As Panibratov points out, even in the case of private firms 
the interest of the Russian state can be high (Panibratov, 2014). 
The investment activity of the top investors is typically driven by the search for 
markets or resources. Strategic-asset-seeking motives can be found especially among 
Russian machinery MNEs outside the top 20. Likewise, efficiency-seeking FDI is more 
typical for mid-sized MNEs. International expansion is done predominantly via 
acquisitions (Kuznetsov, 2013a). Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010) argue that Russian 
MNEs challenge some of the premises of traditional FDI theorems (e.g. the investment 
development path (IDP), the Uppsala school and explanations based on the standard 
theory of factor movements). Regarding the eclectic paradigm, Kalotay (2008a, 2008b, 
2010) and Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010) suggest the extension of the OLI theorem with 
a home-country leg to OLIH (see later). The influence of the government in Russian OFDI 
is undoubtedly large, although its effects on the firms and sectors vary (Panibratov & 
Latukha, 2014). Kalotay (2010) further differentiates between four subsets of H 
advantages, including home-country-based competitive (Hc), business environment 
(Hb), development strategy (Hd) and state involvement (Hs) advantages. The influence 
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of the government in Russian OFDI is undoubtedly large, although its effects on the firms 
and sectors vary (Panibratov & Latukha, 2014). 
 
Russian capital in Poland 
Russia is a surprisingly small investor in Poland despite the common economic 
heritage and geographic proximity of the two countries as well as the recently increased 
activities of Russian multinational companies. This is also astonishing given the fact that 
in the second half of the 1990s, Poland was the second most important destination for 
Russian investors behind the United States, and the main CEE destination (Weiner, 
2006). As it was already shown in Table 3, in 2012, in the total stock of FDI in Poland, 
capital originating (directly) from Russia represented only 0.31%. Additionally, we can 
assume that a substantial part of the FDI stock originating from Cyprus can be of Russian 
origin. Its share in total amounted to 3.55%. Thus, assuming that all FDI from Cyprus 
conceals Russian FDI, the upper limit of the share of Russia in Polish inward FDI stock is 
a mere 3.9%. According to Kuznetsov (2010, p. 9), the Russian share (including 
transhipping OFDI) at the end of 2008, did not exceed 1% in the case of Poland. We can 
assume that this share can be very similar at the end of 2012. (At the same time, 
Germany was the largest investor country (15.1% of total in 2012 stock), followed by 
the Netherlands (14.7%), France (12.3%), Luxembourg (10.2%), Italy (5.6%) and Spain 
(5.4%). Thus the six top investor countries represented almost two-thirds (63.3%) of 
the total stock of inward FDI in Poland.) 
In terms of annual inflows, in six out of the nine years following the EU accession of 
Poland, inflows from Russia were negative. In other years, the FDI inflows never 
exceeded 1% of total. If again, inflows from Cyprus are added, then the inflows would 
remain negative only in two years (2004 and 2006), and its share in total would be 
substantially higher. Certain larger divestment transactions affected the annual FDI 
inflow data. This was characteristic especially during the crisis years of 2007–2009, 
which affected investment (and divestment) by Russian multinationals in Poland. Lukoil, 
for example divested some of its Polish gas station network (Filippov, 2011). 
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According to the data of the Polish National Bank, there is very little new investment 
in the form of equity capital from Russia to Poland. The main component of FDI is 
reinvested earnings of Russian affiliates operating in Poland, especially in 2004. 
Furthermore, these affiliates offer loans to the parent company or other affiliates in 
Russia, as it is shown by the high level and negative sign of the “Other capital” 
component, especially in 2004, 2006 and 2009. 
A similar calculation applied to Cypriot FDI in Poland results in a completely different 
picture. New investment in the form of equity capital is much more substantial, 
especially starting from 2008. Profit repatriation was present in 2008 and 2009, 
otherwise Cypriot affiliates in Poland reinvested their profits in the host country. 
Transactions in other capital were less important than equity capital and overall 
represented a flow towards the Polish affiliates from the Cypriot parent companies 
(except for 2009). Thus most probably, new Russian FDI in Poland arrives mainly 
through the intermediation of Cyprus. 
Data of the Polish Statistical Office show that in 2012 Poland hosted altogether 
25,914 entities with foreign capital.7 According to the top investors list of the Polish 
investment promotion agency for 2013,8 the first 5 companies listed in Table 5 are the 
largest Russian foreign investors in Poland. 
                                                 
7 http://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/economic-activities-finances/activity-of-enterprises-activity-of-
companies/economic-activity-of-entities-with-foreign-capital-in-2012,2,7.html. 
8 http://www.paiz.gov.pl/publications/foreign_investors_in_poland. 
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Table 5: Top Russian investor companies in Poland, 2014 
Name of the 
Russian 
company 
Direct or 
indirect 
investment 
Industry of Russian owner Activities in 
Poland 
Polish firm acquired – 
present firm 
EKOTON Direct Manufacturing of equipment 
for wastewater treatment 
Manufacture 
of machinery 
for wastewater 
treatment 
Prodeko-Ełk  
Kaspersky 
Lab 
Direct Information and 
communication, security 
software 
Infocomm. 
equipment; 
computer 
programming, 
consultancy  
Kaspersky Lab Polska 
Sp. z o.o.  
Luxoft Direct Technology, software 
development 
 Product 
development 
services, 
technology 
solutions 
Luxoft Poland Sp. z 
o.o.  
Gazprom Direct Transporting and storage, 
energy 
Transport via 
pipeline,gas 
transmission 
EuRoPol GAZ S.A  
LUKOIL Indirect, via 
Netherlands 
Productiona and trade of oil 
and gas 
Wholesale of 
oil and gas 
Lukoil Polska  
Severstal  Indirect, via 
Latvia 
Steel and steel-related mining Steel 
production 
Severstallat Silesia Sp. 
z o.o 
Bagdasarian Direct Manufacture of food, drinks, 
tobacco  
Manufacture 
of other food 
Śnieżka S.A. 
 
Source: Polish Investment Promotion Agency9 and authors’ elaboration. 
 
Altogether, Russian-owned firms can be grouped as follows. 
• Large resource-based companies: It is apparent that the two large resource-based 
oil and gas companies, the top two multinationals from Russia (Kuznetsov, 2013), 
Lukoil and Gazprom are present in Poland, with fuel retail trade and gas 
transmission activities, respectively, both headquartered in Warsaw. In 2014, 
there were 116 Lukoil filling stations in Poland, compared to more than 5,800 
worldwide, distributed in 27 countries.10 Before the economic crisis, Lukoil was 
plannin to establish a much larger network of filling stations in Poland.11 Finally, 
in 2009, influenced by Poland’s negative attitude towards Russian capital, Lukoil 
decided to freeze its investment, i.e. to stop expanding its network of filling 
                                                 
9 http://www.paiz.gov.pl/publikacje/inwestorzy_zagraniczni_w_polsce. 
10 http://www.lukoil.com/static_6_5id_2173_.html. 
11 http://www.gasandoil.com/news/2002/02/cne20846; 
http://www.ceeretail.com/news/47640/lukoil-to-develop-fuel-station-chain-in-poland. 
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stations as well as constructing a fuel terminal and acquiring Polish refineries.12 
Lukoil opened its first filling station in Poland in 1996.13 Lukoil Polska, Lukoil’s 
Polish subsidiary, is owned via the Netherlands-based Lukoil Europe Holdings 
B.V. No Russian investment has yet been made in Polish refinery assets. 
Poland is an important host country for Gazprom investment (Panibratov, 2010). 
Gazprom is present in the midstream business by its stake in Poland’s EuRoPol 
GAZ, the owner of the Polish section of the Yamal–Europe gas pipeline, carrying 
Russian gas to Poland and Germany (and onwards) via Belarus. Commissioned in 
1999, the Yamal–Europe pipeline reduced the significance of Slovakia, while 
Poland became an important gas transit country in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Weiner, 2013). EuRoPol GAZ is owned by Gazprom (48%), the Polish state-
controlled oil and gas company PGNiG (48%) and another Polish company, Gas-
Trading (4%).14 EuRoPol GAZ was set up in 1993 to design, construct and operate 
the pipeline.15 However, implementing the EU’s Third Energy Package, EuRoPol 
GAZ handed over operation and Poland’s state-owned natural gas transmission 
system operator (TSO) Gaz-System became the independent system operator 
(ISO) in 2010 (Weiner, 2013). In 2000, a serious scandal was unfolded relating 
the laying of a fibre-optic cable along the Yamal–Europe pipeline. 
Another important Russian investor is Severstal, one of the world’s leading steel 
and steel-related mining companies. Currently, the company has two divisions: 
Severstal Russian Steel and Severstal Resources. The Polish Severstallat Silesia 
Sp. z o.o. was founded in 2008 by the Latvian Severstallat that belongs to 
Severstal Russian Steel.16 Poland is among Severstal’s most important 
destinations in terms of foreign investment in production facilities (Panibratov, 
2010, p. 33). 
                                                 
12 http://www.hotmoney.pl/nabiezaco/Rosyjski-biznes-ucieka-z-Polski-a9882. 
13 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/1996/8/article/lukoil-opens-1st-polish-gas-
station/319985.html. 
14 Gas-Trading is minority-owned by the Gazprom Group. 
15 http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2013/april/article159672/; 
http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2003/may/article62430/; 
http://neftegaz.ru/en/news/view/94450. 
16 www.severstal.com. 
- 16 - 
Kálmán Kalotay, Andrea Éltető, Magdolna Sass, Csaba Weiner / Russian capital in the 
Visegrád countries 
 
• Technology companies: Relatively newly established, quickly growing Russian 
companies with activities concentrated in the information and communication 
technology (ICT) industry are also present in Poland with local affiliates. One of 
them is Kaspersky Lab, the well known information technology (IT) security 
vendor, established in 1997, which is estimated to be one of the world market 
leaders in its area.17 While its headquarters is in Moscow, its holding company is 
registered in the United Kingdom. In Poland, one can find one of the 30 regional 
offices worldwide, and one of the 11 European offices.18 The Polish regional office 
was the fifth to be opened (Panibratov, 2010). 
Moreover, a less widely known, but also quickly growing ICT company, Luxoft has 
also invested in Poland. Luxoft is an IT solutions service provider. It is specialized 
in application and product engineering outsourcing services for enterprise IT 
organizations and software vendors. The company is incorporated in British 
Virgin Islands. According to the website of the company, Krakow is amongst the 
most important delivery locations, with sales and marketing activities as well, 
while Wroclaw is also a global location of the company.19 The Krakow centre, 
established in 2010, offers application and product development services and 
specializes in solutions for the travel, automotive and finance industries.20 The 
Wroclaw location was opened in 2013.21 It focuses on solutions for the banking 
and financial industry. The important position of Poland for the company can be 
underlined by the fact that out of its 20 locations worldwide, there are two in 
Poland. Moreover, the development centres of the company are located in a few 
countries: Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg and Omsk), Ukraine, Poland, Romania, 
the United Kingdom and Vietnam (Filippov, 2011). Both latter cases underline 
the importance of third countries, through which the Russian investment in 
                                                 
17 http://rbth.com/articles/2010/04/29/the_virus_warrior_a_start_up_tale.html. 
18
 http://www.kaspersky.com/about. 
19
 http://www.luxoft.com/luxoft-overview/fact-sheet/. 
20
 http://www.luxoft.com/pr/extends-global-delivery-network-with-opening-of-poland-development-center/. 
21
 http://www.luxoft.com/pr/luxoft-extends-global-delivery-network-with-opening-a-second-delivery-location-
in-poland/. 
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Poland is realised. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that these two companies 
are present with market-seeking affiliates in Poland, though in the case of the 
development centre of Luxoft, efficiency-seeking motives also play a role. Apart 
from favourable wages, political stability and protection of intellectual rights 
were important factors for Luxoft.22 
• Engineering companies: EKOTON belongs neither to the Russian top 
multinationals, nor to the quickly growing IT company category. It is an industrial 
group whose main activity is providing engineering services and producing 
equipment for wastewater treatment using environmentally friendly 
technologies. It was founded in 1995. The Polish subsidiary plays a much larger 
role for this medium-sized multinational company: it has altogether 300 
employees and three plants in three countries: Poland (Bialystok), Russia and 
Ukraine.23 Out of the six representative offices, one can also be found in Poland.24 
This investment is mostly local market seeking, but access to the EU market with 
a large potential may be at least as important. The geographic position of Poland 
also plays a role, as well as the “knowledge” factor, given the innovative nature of 
production and products. 
According to the list of the previous years, Bagdasarian, a Russian company 
active in food production, owner of Śnieżka S.A. – Lubzina is also present on the 
Russian market. The entry mode in Śnieżka was greenfield, located in a special 
economic zone in order to qualify for investment incentives. Having a look at the 
top Cypriot investors in Poland, we could not identify any of them, which would 
conceal a Russian company. 
 
Overall, the surprisingly low involvement of Russian multinationals in Poland can be 
partly attributed to the negative sentiments attached to Russian capital in the country 
(Weiner, 2006). This can be illustrated by the fact that besides successfully operating 
                                                 
22
 http://bigstory.ap.org/article/poland-emerging-major-european-outsourcing-hub. 
23
 http://en.ekoton.com/about-us/#. 
24
 http://issuu.com/elenashestakovskaya/docs/ekoton_booklet_2014_engl?e=4852988/7529014#search. 
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Russian affiliates, the Polish resistance towards Russian capital is manifest in 
unsuccessful takeovers as well like in the case of Azoty Tarnów. It is the biggest 
chemicals producer in Poland and its takeover by the Russian firm Acron was hindered 
in 2013 and 2014 because Azoty is considered as a strategic asset for the Polish state.25 
Another case was that of the Polish construction firm Polimex. In 2012 the Russian VIS 
Construction wanted to be the biggest shareholder but as a reaction the Polish Industrial 
Development Agency bought the largest package of shares instead.26 
Furthermore, articles published in the Russian press call the attention to the Polish 
“resistance” towards Russian economic expansion in the country. According to a survey, 
cited by the English-language version of Pravda, the Russian newspaper, 62% of Poles in 
2012 believed that their government should prevent that Russian companies or citizens 
take over Polish firms.27 
 
                                                 
25 See e.g. www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-19/azoty-dives-on-polish-gambit-to-thwart-russian-buy-
warsaw-mover.html and http://www.chemanager-online.com/en/news-opinions/headlines/russian-
firms-be-fined-over-grupa-azoty-investments. 
26 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/10/23/poland-russia-investment-idUKL5E8LJPIC20121023. 
27 http://english.pravda.ru/world/europe/02-11-2012/122691-poland_russia-0/. 
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Russian capital in the Czech Republic 
Nominally, Russia represents a small portion of the inward FDI stock of the Czech 
Republic. However, if the sizeable investment originating in Cyprus, as well as Russian 
investment transhipped via other countries, is added, the real importance of Russian 
capital in the Czech Republic is much higher. It is also confirmed by the data of the 
Bisnode business information agency: in terms of the number of foreign-owned 
companies, Russians were at the first place in 2013. According to the aggregate capital 
stock in Czech firms, Russians occupy 21st place with 19% of companies with foreign 
equity.28 
At the end of 2012, representatives of Czech business circles established the Russian–
Czech Mixed Chamber of Commerce29 with the goal to support Russian investment in the 
Czech Republic. The Chamber opened a Representation in Moscow in June 2014 for 
assistance in agreements on cooperation, partner search and marketing in Russia. 
Russian investors are present mainly in the Czech manufacturing sector, but there are 
also two banks with Russian interests. 
• Banking: The European–Russian Bank was founded in Prague in 2009 as a branch of 
First Czech–Russian Bank (FCRB) which was the first (and then the only) Russian 
bank, which received a license for banking activities in the EU. FCRB was founded in 
1996 in Moscow and dominated by the former Czech Investment and Postal Bank. 
After the fall of the scandalous Investment and Postal Bank,30 the bank gradually 
came under Russian (Gazprom) control. FCRB was established to operate foreign 
trade and investment projects of the Russian Federation in the Czech Republic and 
the provision of banking services to companies that are involved in the Czech–
Russian trade relations. The European–Russian Bank opened another office in 
Karlovy Vary in 2010. According to press information, the European–Russian Bank 
and the FCRB could have ties to Russian intelligence and organised crime.31 In 2012, 
                                                 
28 http://euro.e15.cz/archiv/rusove-jsou-nejpocetnejsimi-zahranicnimi-vlastniky-ceskych-firem-
1044923. 
29 http://www.leadersmagazine.cz/2013/02/18/new-possibilities-for-czech-russian-
cooperation/#.U5bKrvl_vTo. 
30 http://www.ce-review.org/00/25/culik25.html. 
31 http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.hu/2009/09/from-tanks-to-spies-to-banks-european.html. 
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at times of embargo against Iran, the First Czech–Russian Bank was said to service 
Iran trade facilities.32  Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank, acquired the Czech assets of 
Austria’s Volksbank in 2012, together with the Volksbank affiliates in six other 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.33 Sberbank CZ has 23 branches in the Czech 
Republic and employs 720 people.34 
• Real estate: Russian capital (in large part from private persons) has a strong presence 
in the Czech real-estate industry, because Karlovy Vary is a popular tourist and 
business meeting place for Russians, who purchased houses, hotels and other real 
estate there. In 2013, the Czech Republic was the 9th most important destinations for 
Russian real-estate investment.35 
• Manufacturing: Czech assets were used to leverage competitiveness in a strategic way 
in the case of pipe manufacturer ChTPZ Group36’s acquisition of MSA, a leading 
manufacturer of industrial valves (via Arkley Capital S.a.r.l. registered in Luxemburg, 
which manages the assets of ChTPZ).37 It was a strategic step from ChTPZ to increase 
ChTPZ Group’s competitiveness and meet the requirements of fuel and energy sector 
companies more comprehensively. The transaction – according to estimates worth 
more than ten million dollars – provided the ChTPZ Group access to the market for oil 
and gas pipeline accessories. The Czech company was integrated to ChTPZ Group 
administratively, when the 25-year-old son of the Russian energy and industry 
minister Khristenko was put to the board of directors in MSA.38 The Russian owner 
also wished to modernize the firm, to increase its sales in Russia, to draft investment 
proposals, to bolster capacity in the Czech Republic and to build a similar plant in 
Russia. 
                                                 
32 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303299604577323601794862004. 
33 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
34 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-23/sberbank-plans-to-expand-in-czech-republic-and-
germany.html. 
35 From among other CEE countries, Latvia is 6th, Croatia 14th, Estonia 16th, Hungary 18th, Slovenia 19th, 
Lithuania 25th (http://prian.ru/pub/26825.html). 
36 Chelyabinsk tube-rolling plant group 
37 http://www.msa.cz/en/o-firme/rimera-group.  
38 http://www.vg.hu/vallalatok/miniszter-az-apad-akkor-kapsz-egy-ceget-ajandekba-139404. 
and http://en.novayagazeta.ru/investigations/8586.html. 
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Expansion was the main aim for the personal protective equipment producer Vostok- 
Service buying Cerva Export Import a.s. in 2006. Cerva has been operating on the market 
since 1991 and concluded direct business contracts with important world suppliers and 
manufacturers. After its acquisition, Cerva began to develop and expand more. In 2007, 
Cerva established affiliates in Russia. In 2009, a new informational system SAP was 
introduced and the whole company moved to its new offices. The company acquired 
100%, and 51% shares in two companies – the Hungarian Vektor Kft., the biggest 
manufacturer of special clothing in Central and Eastern Europe, and Panda, an Italian 
manufacturer of work and leisure shoes. The company’s turnover increased dynamically 
and exceeds €70 million. Cerva became a springboard for the European expansion of 
Vostok-Service, which now is an international holding company with foreign assets in 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Italy and India. In 2007, the press spoke 
of Vostok-Service as a firm with low transparency of ownership structure but it is also 
one of the few examples for successful Russian companies in the light industry. The firm 
has powerful owner and contacts, important business partners.39 Vostok-Service is 
owned by Vladimir Golovnev, member of the ruling United Russia party. From 2007 to 
2011, he was a member of Duma, a Deputy Chairman of the Duma’s Economics and 
Business Committee. In 2013, the press discovered that clothes for Vostok-Service are 
made under inhuman conditions by women prisoners.40 
Expansion into new industries, such as regional air transportation, was the main 
motive of Ural Mining and Metallurgical Company’s (UGMK) acquisition of a 51% stake in 
the Czech aircraft manufacturer Aircraft Industries a.s. in 2008. The deal can be linked to 
UGMK’s plans of expansion into new sectors, such as regional air transportation and the 
production of short-haul aircraft. UGMK is the second largest copper producer in Russia. 
The Czech plant is the largest Czech manufacturer of small transport aircrafts, its 
flagship aircraft is L-410. The Russian owners of the company have spent on R&D and on 
new technology – for instance, a varnishing plant. A year after UGMK purchased 51 per 
cent of the company, orders arrived from the Russian and other ex-Soviet markets for 
$14 million. This figure has increased five times until 2013, reaching $76 million. (Sales 
of the L-410 aircraft in the rest of the world increased much less dynamically.) The 
                                                 
39 http://www.rumafia.com/material.php?id=95. 
40 http://newslanc.com/2013/10/05/who-profits-from-russian-slave-labor/. 
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company’s global turnover and its profit rose and the number of employees increased 
from 515 to a thousand for 2014.41 In 2011, the press wrote about a dramatic board 
meeting at the Czech firm when two executive were shot.42 In 2013, UGMK bought all 
100% of stock in Czech Aircraft Industries. “Now we are reformatting management and 
will be forming an investment program that takes into account our understanding of the 
development of this enterprise, and considering the market that is developing in Russia 
and beyond,” said the company’s general director, Andrei Kozitsyn.43 
Three Skoda subsidiaries were also acquired by a Russian investor. The Škoda JS 
company in this form has been active in engineering and supplies for the nuclear energy 
industry since 1999. (Presently Škoda JS employs 1100 employees).44 Škoda Hute s.r.o. 
and Škoda, Kovárny s.r.o. produced metallurgy, steel products. In 2004 the Russian OMZ 
(United Heavy Machinery) took over these companies. OMZ is a large Russia-based 
international heavy industry and manufacturing conglomerate owned by Gazprombank 
since 2006.45 The motivation of OMZ was market access to East European markets – as 
the manager himself told the press.46 In 2007, Škoda Hute and Kovárny were merged 
and re-branded to Pilsen Steel s.r.o. In 2010, Pilsen Steel was sold to United Group SA 
(established in 2008 as an international metallurgy group with headquarters in 
Luxembourg and operating offices in Moscow and Pilsen).47 
• Hydrocarbons: Market access was a motivation for Russia’s Lukoil in taking over the 
JET filling stations in the Czech Republic in 2007 and created an own Czech affiliate 
for the operation of the 44 filling stations.48 In 2014, Lukoil rationalized its activity 
and sold these stations to the Hungarian Mol oil company.49 Lukoil owns also Lukoil 
                                                 
41 http://czechrepublic.newsdeskmedia.com/Images/Upload/micro_sites/czech-republic/PDFs/flying-
high.pdf. 
42 http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/283000/Two-shot-dead-at-Czech-plane-plant. 
43 http://business.highbeam.com/407705/article-1G1-349594143/ugmk-consolidates-100-stock-czech-
aircraft-industries. 
44 http://www.skoda-js.cz/en/about-company/company-profile.shtml. 
45 http://www.rzd-partner.com/press/288657/. 
46 http://www.power-m.ru/eng/press/news.aspx?news=1725. 
47 www.untdgroup.com. 
48 The petrol stations of Poland (83), Hungary (30) and Slovakia (14) were taken over at the same period. 
49 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-s-lukoil-sells-petrol-stations-in-czech-
republic-slovakia-hungary/504573.html. 
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Aviation Czech s.r.o that provides fuel supply and fuelling aircraft of contractors at 
international airports of Prague and Ostrava.50 
Local market was also an aim for Gazprom with acquiring a 50.14% share in the Czech 
Vemex (gas importer) via its German affiliate (Gazprom Germania GmbH) in 2009.51 
Other owners of Vemex were indirectly also bound to Gazprom. Vemex has another 
Czech affiliate since 2011 dealing with distribution: Vemex Energie, controlled by 51%. 
Vemex has a 100% affiliate in Slovakia too: Vemex Energo s.r.o., which was founded in 
Bratislava in 2003 to trade natural gas in Slovakia. Vemex Energo offers natural gas of 
Russian origin, which obtained under a contract between the companies Gazprom 
export and Vemex. In 2011, Vemex Energo also began the market supply for households 
and small clients as a part of the expansion of trade activities of companies operating 
within the Gazprom Group on end-user markets of EU countries. In 2011, EU 
Commission officials conducted searches in the offices of Gazprom Germania and Vemex 
too because of “concerns that the companies concerned may have engaged in 
anticompetitive practices in breach of EU antitrust rules or that they are in possession of 
information relating to such practices”.52 In 2012, the Commission opened formal 
investigation and prepares antitrust charges against Gazprom.53 
• Reverse geographical expansion was the main motivation of TVEL Fuel Company, 
which belongs to the Rosatom Group. Together with Czech ALTA Invest, it founded the 
firm ALVEL in 2011, taking a minority share in the joint venture. The Czech partner is 
the majority shareholder possessing 50% +1 shares of the equity capital. The rest 
belongs to the Russian investors. It was a culmination of a long-term cooperation 
between the Czech firm Alta Invest and the Russian TVEL that manufactures and 
                                                 
50 In 2014, the Czech Administration of State Material Reserves imposed a 27 million crowns fine on the 
firm for violating a contract on oil supply. Lukoil signed a contract in 2009 for replacing old fuel with 
new one when the fuel prices were falling. Later the fuel prices went up and it was unprofitable for 
Lukoil to supply the promised fuel. The contract was repeatedly extended and modified to more suit 
Lukoil. According to the last version signed a year ago, Lukoil does not have to replace the old fuel with 
aviation fuel, but with standard diesel oil or gasoline. But Lukoil did not supply the fuel by the deadline 
in 2013. The case is on the personal level influenced by top politics, because the head of Lukoil Aviation 
Czech is Martin Nejedly, President Milos Zeman’s counsellor and vice chairman of his party. See 
http://radio.cz/en/section/news/lukoil-czech-lands-27-million-fine-over-oil-reserves-deal and 
http://praguemonitor.com/2014/01/06/ln-politics-influences-state-firms-dispute-lukoil. 
51 http://www.vemex.cz/en/about/. 
52 http://en.ria.ru/world/20110928/167199336.html.  
53 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e42946bc-8fed-11e3-aee9-00144feab7de.html#axzz34yI1y0Sj. 
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supplies fuel for a total of 76 power reactors in the world, of which there are four 
reactors at Dukovany and two in Temelín. One third of the electricity produced in the 
Czech Republic comes from nuclear power plants using Russian nuclear fuel. ALVEL 
combines Czech knowledge, speciality and technical execution with Russian 
technologies and TVEL know-how. ALVEL functioned successfully throughout 2012; all 
planned economic indicators were achieved. According to the results of the accounting 
period, the revenue exceeded €2.5 million.54 The Company is planning to expand 
geographically, including the East European markets (Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria) 
and to open a branch in Moscow to promote company’s services on the Russian market. 
• Steel: Evraz Holding’s privatization-related acquisition of the giant Vítkovice Steel 
(2005) was driven by market-seeking motives.55 The acquisition of Vítkovice Steel was 
carried out by the Cyprus-registered affiliate of Evraz Mastercroft Limited. Evraz 
Vítkovice Steel (EVS) was hit by the crisis and the general downturn in the European 
steel market and in end-2012 steel production was stopped for four months and in 2013 
again twice for a month.56 The number of workers has gradually decreased in EVS to 
1,100. In 2013, EVS produced only 571 thousand tons of steel products. The company 
became indebted, trade unions protested. On 3 April 2014, a group of private investors 
including Martinley Holdings, Nabara Holdings, Vitect Services, Hayston Investments 
and Dawnaly Investments purchased 100% of shares (each buying 20%) of Evraz 
Vítkovice Steel a.s. from Evraz. Investors paid $89 million for the plant plus took on its 
                                                 
54http://www.tvel.ru/wps/wcm/connect/tvel/tvelsite.eng/presscenter/news/dbcd94004ef23e78ade3ef
398191de8b. 
55 The history of Vítkovice Steel dates back to 1830 with steel production. Later the company built its own 
rolling mills. By the mid-2000s, Vítkovice Steel became the third largest steel company and employed 
1,600 people. Its steel production reached 960 thousand tons of steel per year. In 2005, the Czech 
Government approved the results of the tender for sale of this last government-owned steel company. 
The tender winner was the Russian group Evraz Holding, which offered $285 million for the company. 
The firm promised to invest around $120 million more to the development of the company and the 
region. Evraz Group was created in 1992 by Alexander Abramov and the most (31%) of its shares is 
owned by the Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich. The steel production of Evraz is 13.7 million tons, 
owns steel mills and mines in Russia, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Italy, the United States , Canada and 
South Africa. Evraz is the largest steel producer in Russia and the twelfth largest steel producer in the 
world. 
56 http://rt.com/business/russia-czech-steel-evraz-457/, http://www.rzd-partner.com/news/cargo-
owners/russia-s-evraz-resumes-steel-output-at-czech--vitkovice-steel/. 
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debt of $198 million, including $129 million it owes to Evraz57 and want to continue the 
company’s development.  
• Telecommunications, information technology (IT): The Russian micro-electronics 
producer JSC NIIME & Micron used the Czech Republic as a springboard for expansion in 
third markets. NIIME & Micron (a Russian micro-electronics producer) and Czech 
STROM Telecom (a Czech telecommunications equipment and software manufacturer) 
established Sitronics in 2002 as a Scientific Concern. In June 2004, the Company gained a 
controlling share in Kvazar-Micro, the largest Ukrainian IT company.58 As a result of this, 
the Company launched an IT services business line. In 2005, assets that formed the 
Scientific Concern, as well as Kvazar-Micro and Sitronics were consolidated into the 
brand name Sitronics. In June 2006, Sitronics purchased a majority stake in the Greek 
Intracom Telecom. This purchase gave access to South European, Middle Eastern and 
African telecommunication service markets, which generated substantial product range 
synergy, as well as opened up numerous R&D designs. In 2007, Sitronics put 17.5% of its 
shares on the London Stock Exchange, introduced new technologies and funded 
corporate development with the gained capital.59 Since 2008, the company has 
undertaken key measures to optimize and integrate the Group’s businesses and in 2009, 
Sitronics launched new products and concluded numerous landmark contracts. In 2012, 
the Russian AFK Sistema group gained full control of Sitronics.60 (The chairman of 
Sistema was arrested in September 2014 on suspicion of a former money laundering.)61 
An analysis of key projects (Table 6) reveals a variety of motives for Russian 
investors’ presence in the Czech Republic. 
                                                 
57 http://www.praguepost.com/economy/38165-evraz-sells-vitkovice-steel-to-investor-
group#ixzz33tOPeX3C. 
58 Sitronics Annual Report 2008 (www.sitronics.ru). 
59 www.sitronics.com. 
60 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/sistema-gets-full-control-of-
sitronics/467039.html. 
61 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/14/us-russia-sistema-yevtushenkov-arrest-
idUSKCN0IY10N20141114. 
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Table 6. Main Russian investors in the Czech Republic, 2014  
Name of the 
Russian 
company 
Direct or indirect 
investment 
Industry of Russian 
owner 
Activities in the Czech 
Republic 
Czech firm acquired 
– present firm 
Evraz Group Indirect, via Cyprus 
Mining, steel and 
vanadium production Steel mills 
Vítkovice Steel – 
Evraz Vítkovice Steel 
(sold in 2014) 
Gazprom Indirect, via Germany Energy Gas distribution Vemex 
Vostok Service Direct Textile, clothing Personal protective 
equipment Cerva Export-Import 
Lukoil Indirect, via Netherlands Oil, and gas Petrol stations 
JET petrol stations 
(sold in 2014) 
Lukoil-Aero Direct Oil, gas Airport fuel supply Lukoil Aviation Czech s.r.o 
Sberbank Indirect, via Austria Banking Banking Volksbank offices 
UGMK Direct Copper mining Aircraft manufacturing Czech Aircraft Industries 
ChTPZ Indirect, via Luxemburg Pipeline manufacturing Pipeline fittings MSA 
TVEL  Direct Nuclear fuel Nuclear fuel supply Alta Invest – ALVEL (joint venture) 
JSC NIIME & 
Micron Direct Microelectronics IT services 
Strom Telekom – 
Sitronics TS 
OMZ 
(Gazprom) Direct Heavy industry 
Engineering and 
supplies for nuclear 
energy industry 
Škoda JS 
OMZ, later 
United Group 
SA  
Direct Heavy industry Metallurgy, steel 
Škoda  Hute, Kovárny 
(later Pilsen Steel 
s.r.o) 
Source: Authors’ collection. 
 
In sum, the Russian presence in the Czech Republic serves mostly as a local market 
access or a starting point for gaining positions in the neighbouring regions. Regarding 
the entry mode of Russian investors, we cannot find pure greenfield investment, only 
acquisitions or joint ventures. The activities of Russian-owned firms in the Czech 
Republic are not always transparent, follow the oligarchic practice of the home country 
and sometimes do not fulfil legal requirements.62 
 
                                                 
62
 There are also “sleeping” Russian firms with no activity, like Albion CZ that was liquidated in June 2014 and 
belonged to Alexander Babakov (member of the Russian Duma and banned from the EU). See: 
http://www.novinky.cz/ekonomika/347574-rusky-poslanec-babakov-unikl-sankcim-v-cr-dablickou-firmu-
zlikvidoval.html. 
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Russian capital in Hungary 
Russian investment in Hungary has attracted lots of attention at the turn of the 
century (due to the acquisitions of shares in Hungary’s petrochemical manufacturers 
BorsodChem and TVK by the Russian gas giant Gazprom) and at the beginning of the 
2010s (due to the acquisition of shares in Hungarian oil and gas company Mol by 
Surgutneftegaz, Russia’s third largest oil producer). In both cases, Russian attempts 
ultimately proved to be unsuccessful due to local resistance to takeovers, fuelled by fear 
of Russian capital. Still, Russian FDI plays a limited role in Hungary. Hungary’s 
leadership in Central and Eastern Europe in attracting Russian FDI is deemed to be 
temporary, being limited to the end of both 2009 and 2010 (Table 2), and was only 
because of the Surgutneftegaz deal. Acquired in 2009, and subsequently sold in 2011, 
Surgutneftegaz’s stake in Mol was the single largest Russian FDI project in Hungary.63 
Not only was the deal highly significant in Hungarian context, but it presented the 
evidence that very large outward direct investment from Russia was also registered 
during the economic crisis. The Surgutneftegaz deal occupied the sixth and seventh 
places among the top outward merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions from Russia 
between 2007 and 2009 and between 2007 and 2010, respectively (IMEMO, 2011; 
Kuznetsov, 2011). But excluding the Surgutneftegaz deals, Hungarian and Russian 
bilateral data reflect mainly the activities of the Rakhimkulov family (i.e. those of Megdet 
Rakhimkulov and his sons, Ruslan Rakhimkulov and Timur Rakhimkulov). This is so 
despite the fact that more than 2,000 joint ventures with Russian ownership are 
operating in Hungary.64 Among the top 20 non-financial Russian-based MNEs, ranked by 
foreign assets, only a few companies are active in FDI in Hungary. 
The main industries of involvement of Russian capital in Hungary include banking, 
hydrocarbons, metallurgy, machinery and real estate: 
                                                 
63
 Surgutneftegaz picked Mol for its first outward foreign direct investment. The purpose of the acquisition was 
unclear, and the ownership structure of Surgutneftegaz has not been made public either. Mol did everything 
possible to keep Surgutneftegaz away from exercising its ownership rights, prompting Surgutneftegaz to resell 
its stake to the Hungarian State. 
64
 The sources of this figure are the Hungarian Investment and Trade Agency (HITA, and its predecessor ITD 
Hungary) and the Trade Representation of Russia in Hungary. 
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• Banking: Having played a significant role, right from the start, both as a 
representative and an investor for his own account, Megdet Rakhimkulov, a former 
Gazprom official, has been a top Russian investor in Hungary. The General Banking and 
Trust (ÁÉB) was bought in 1996 by Gazprombank and had been taken over gradually by 
the Rakhimkulovs’ family company, the Hungary-registered Kafijat, and its London-
registered (at that time) subsidiary Firthlion Ltd. Kafijat was used to acquire stakes 
(directly or indirectly) in companies in Hungary. A number of companies merged into 
Kafijat, and, finally, at the end of 2007, ÁÉB also did so.65 Previously, about 70% of ÁÉB’s 
operations had been devoted to Gazprom and Gazprombank. In 2004, this proportion 
accounted for about 8–10%, but a large part of the operations was still linked to Russian 
clients.66 After ÁÉB discontinued its activities, no Russian-related bank existed in 
Hungary (except for representations), although the Rakhimkulov family has continued 
to own a 9% share in Hungary’s leading retail bank OTP Bank Nyrt. But Sberbank’s 
takeover of Volksbank International AG in 2012 also included the assets in Hungary (see 
above). A continuation of history is proven by the fact that part of these Hungarian 
branches had been owned by ÁÉB. Sberbank is operating only 51 branches in Hungary, 
and has not reached a share of 5 per cent in most segments. The aim is, as a universal 
bank, to have a share of more than 5 per cent in all important segments in Hungary by 
2018.67 Again, investment in the sector is mainly of a market-seeking motive. The 
primary objective of Sberbank Hungary Zrt. is to provide comprehensive services to 
Russian private and corporate clients, and to enhance the trade between the Central and 
                                                 
65
 Rakhimkulov moved back to Russia in 2007. With this, he changed his residency status from a Hungarian 
investor to a Russian one. In 2008, the Cyprus-based AWB Consulting Services Ltd. and Charing 
Investments Ltd., i.e. the companies of the Rakhimkulov brothers, acquired Kafijat (“A Rahimkulov fiúk 
tőkeátcsoportosítása”, HVG, No. 31/2008). In 2008, Kafijat’s share capital was reduced substantially and 
large dividends were paid. Available sources suggest Firthlion is now equally owned by AWB Consulting 
Ltd. and Charing Investments Ltd. (https://www.check-business.co.uk/business/03760112/firthlion-ltd; 
https://www.duedil.com/company/03760112/firthlion-ltd/people). We do not know whether there have been 
any changes in the ownership structures of the two Cypriot companies since 2008. Timur Rakhimkulov, now 
a minority shareholder, is going to be the majority owner of Business Telecom Nyrt., or BTel, a Hungarian 
telecom provider, via his Hungary-registered company SkillInvest Kft. 
66
 Simon, Ernő and Ildikó Szép, “Meg kell őszülni a sikerhez – Beszélgetés Medget Rahimkulovval, az Általános 
Értékforgalmi bank többségi tulajdonosával”, Figyelő, Vol. 48, No. 45, 2004, pp. 68–71. 
67
 Palkó, István, “Mit keres egy orosz óriás a magyar és a német bankpiacon?”, Portfolio.hu, 7 July 2014, 
http://www.portfolio.hu/vallalatok/penzugy/mit_keres_egy_orosz_orias_a_magyar_es_a_nemet_bankpiacon.2
00990.html. 
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East European countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States.68 Currently, the 
Hungarian banking industry is facing refund obligations regarding foreign-currency 
loans which were very popular before the economic crisis, but since then the exchange 
rates have depreciated markedly.69 
• Hydrocarbons: Neither in the gas industry nor in the case of oil, were Russian oil 
and gas companies able to control the entire value chain from wellhead to final customer 
(i.e. to vertically integrate their business). The state-controlled Gazprom plays a limited 
role as an investor in Hungary, and the issue of unbundling of transmission assets under 
the EU’s Third Energy Package for an internal gas and electricity market in the EU 
further limits its abilities. Gazprom uses Panrusgáz Gas Trading Zrt.,70 an intermediary 
established in 1994, to channel imported Russian gas to local incumbent Hungarian Gas 
Trade Zrt., a subsidiary of Hungary’s state-owned electricity company MVM. Panrusgáz 
was forced to pay significant amounts of “crisis tax” in Hungary, prompting Panrusgáz to 
ask for revoking its gas trading licence.71 Among gas traders in Hungary, two companies 
have Russian owners. One of them is Centrex Hungary Zrt. which was registered in 2004. 
The Russo–German joint venture WIEE Hungary Kft. was established in 2010 and 
received a gas trading license in Hungary in February 2011. Its ultimate owners are 
Gazprom and the BASF Group’s Wintershall of Germany.72 Gazprom’s joint projects with 
                                                 
68
 http://www.sberbank.hu/en/home/headline/about.htm. 
69
 Refund obligations concern unfair unilateral contract changes and exchange-rate margins (Gergely, Andras, 
Marton Eder and Zoltan Simon, “Hungary Banks Face $4.1 Billion Cost on Loan Refund Bill”, Bloomberg, 12 
September 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-24/hungary-central-bank-supports-use-of-
reserves-for-loan-refunds.html). 
70 The Russian shareholders of Panrusgáz are Gazprom Export (owning 40% of the shares), the export 
arm of Gazprom, and the Hungary-registered Centrex Hungary Zrt. (owning 10% of the shares). 
Incorporated in 2004, Centrex Hungary is an affiliate of the Gazprombank-controlled and Vienna-based 
Centrex Europe Energy & Gas AG. (Note that Gazprom has not had control over Gazprombank for many 
years.) Accounted for a minor amount, Centrex Hungary is another long-term buyer of Russian gas for 
Hungary. 
71 In December 2010, Panrusgáz asked for the Hungarian energy regulator to revoke its gas trading 
licence, which the Hungarian Energy Office did so in February 2011. 
72 There is also another gas trader in Hungary, an obscure one, which had Russian ownership. MET 
Hungary Zrt. (formerly Mol Energy Trade Kft. and then Mol Energy Trade Zrt.) was set up in 2007 by Mol 
and became half-owned by the Belize-based Normeston Trading Ltd. in late 2009. In 2012, Normeston’s 
stake was sold to a company registered in the Cayman Islands. The only information released is that 
Normeston is owned by a Russian national. The Hungarian watchdog NGO Atlatszo.hu speculated that 
Rakhimkulov was behind Normeston (Sarkadi Nagy, Márton, “Orosz oligarcha lehetett a Mol 
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Mol in Hungary did not turn out to be fruitful. Their two joint ventures, including SEP 
Company Kft. and Pusztaföldvár Gas Storage Zrt., went into voluntary liquidation and 
were deleted from the registry in 2014 and 2012, respectively.73 Meanwhile, in 
Hungary’s gas sector, MVM has become established as the main player (both as the 
largest gas trader and commercial gas storing company) in no time. Also, it has obtained 
a foothold in Hungary’s gas transmission. Due to the failure of Surgutneftegaz, there are 
no Russian companies with shareholdings in the Visegrád countries’ refinery industry. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, three Russian companies have oil refineries, including 
those of Lukoil (in Romania and Bulgaria), Zarubezhneft (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
and Gazprom Neft (in Serbia). Lukoil, Russia’s second largest (and the largest privately 
owned) oil producer, became a participant in Hungary’s motor fuels retail and wholesale 
market in 2004, although limited in size. In 2014, Lukoil Hungary Kft., Lukoil’s 
Hungarian subsidiary through a Netherlands-based Lukoil affiliate, controlled a network 
of only 75 filling stations in Hungary with a 6% retail market share in 2013 (Lukoil, 
2014). Examining the Hungarian gasoline retail market for the period 2007–2008, 
Farkas et al. (2009) found that the prices of the vertically integrated Lukoil had been one 
of the lowest in Hungary, and possibly the largest competitive pressure on the market 
had been coming from Lukoil. Meanwhile, the vertically integrated Mol and OMV were 
selling for higher-than-average prices. Motor fuels of Lukoil Hungary Kft. are supplied 
both from Hungary’s Mol Duna Refinery and Romania’s Petrotel–Lukoil Refinery. Due to 
the crisis tax in Hungary, Lukoil Hungary Kft. had handed back its wholesale fuel licence 
                                                                                                                                                        
tulajdonostársa”, Atlatszo.hu, 4 December 2013, http://atlatszo.hu/2013/12/04/orosz-oligarcha-
lehetett-a-mol-tulajdonostarsa/). 
73 SEP Company Kft. was set up in 2006 to examine the possibilities of the extension of the trans-Black Sea 
Blue Stream gas pipeline (running from Russia to Turkey) as well as construction of underground gas 
storage facilities and creation of a gas trading hub in Hungary, but none of the ideas were implemented. 
However, SEP Company Kft. had some role in South Stream’s preliminary studies. Registered in early 
2010, Pusztaföldvár Gas Storage Zrt. aimed at constructing an underground gas storage facility in 
Hungary. According to Hungarian economic daily Világgazdaság, Mol revised cost estimates for the 
project, which proved to be too high, about twice the former number (“Világgazdaság: a Mol lemond a 
gáztárolóról”, Hvg.hu, 16 November 2011, http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20111116_mol_gaztarolo). 
Compared to its gas consumption, Hungary is a great power of gas storages, and there is no need for 
further expansion (“Fő feladatunk, hogy közös nevezőre hozzuk a Gazprom Export és az E.ON Földgáz 
Trade érdekeit”, gáz.áram, Spring 2010, pp. 18–21). 
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but later returned to the market.74 In 2014, Lukoil decided to withdraw from the CEE 
region. Its Hungarian and Slovakian filling stations are expected to be acquired by Norm 
Benzinkút Kft, which had been registered in Hungary but is related to Russia.75 Natural-
resource-seeking Russian FDI has also appeared in Hungary. Gazprom Neft, Gazprom’s 
oil arm and Russia’s fourth largest crude producer, has interests in exploration ventures 
in Hungary via Serbia’s NIS, majority owned by Gazprom Neft.76 
• Metallurgy: There is a strong indirect Russian presence in Hungarian metallurgy. 
In late 2009, Russian investors obtained a stake of 50% plus two shares in Ukraine’s 
Industrial Union of Donbass (ISD). As a result, the iron and steel industry in Dunaújváros 
(situated some 70 kilometres south from Budapest) and Diósgyőr (being part of the 
Northern Hungarian city Miskolc) acquired Russian ultimate owners. In some media 
sources, the Russian state-owned Vnesheconombank (VEB) appears as the largest owner 
of ISD and ISD Dunaferr Danube Ironworks Zrt. in Dunaújváros.77 But in official 
documents, the role of VEB is described as assistance to unnamed Russian investors to 
purchase ISD.78 Due to the permanent crisis of Hungarian iron and steel, this 
engagement seems to carry high risks. In 2013, it was announced that as part of a cost 
optimization program, they were looking to cut staff by 1,500. As a reaction, the 
Hungarian government decided to buy ISD Dunaferr from VEB, but the offer was 
refused. In July 2014, the United States widened its sanctions to include VEB. At the time 
of the takeover, Dunaferr was presumably needed for ISD because of Hungary’s rolling 
                                                 
74 B. Horváth, Lilla, “Erősített tavaly a Lukoil”, Világgazdaság, 24 May 2013, 
http://www.vg.hu/vallalatok/erositett-tavaly-a-lukoil-404253. 
75 It is a joint venture between IMFA Petroleum Kft. (set up by a former Hungarian representative of the 
now defunct Russian oil producer Yukos) and the above-mentioned Belize-based Normeston Trading 
Ltd.  
76 NIS’ affiliate Pannon Naftagas Kft. was registered in Hungary in 2011. It is taking part in exploration 
projects in Hungary in a consortium with the Hungarian affiliates of Canada’s Falcon Oil & Gas and 
Austria’s Rohl-Aufsuchungs Aktiengesellchaft (RAG). Moreover, in 2014, NIS bought half of RAG Kiha Kft., 
a subsidiary of RAG via RAG Hungary Kft., which owns an exploration licence in its own right. 
77
 Ábrahám, Ambrus, “Májusban döntést ígérnek az állókohóról”, Népszabadság, 25 April 2013, 
http://nol.hu/gazdasag/majusban_dontest_igernek_az_allo_kohorol. 
78
 “Vnesheconombank Chairman Vladimir Dmitriev’s Interview to the TV Channel Russia 24” (TV Channel 
Russia 24, Interview, 2 December 2013), VEB – News, 3 December 2013, 
http://veb.ru/en/press/news/arch_news/index.php?id_19=31057; “Regular Meeting of Vnesheconombank’s 
Supervisory Board Held”, VEB – Supervisory Board Decisions, 19 December 2013, 
http://veb.ru/en/press/ns/archive/index.php?id_19=31110. 
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mill capacity and the access to the EU market. But the EU market has been losing its 
significance and the restrictions have been cut.79 Metallurgy in Diósgyőr has moved from 
one liquidation to another, and at the company DAM in Diósgyőr, there has been no 
production since December 2008. In 2010, the liquidator sold the assets of Diósgyőr 
metallurgy to Öko-Ferr Kft., belonging to ISD Dunaferr’s ISD Power Kft. Mechel Service 
Hungary Kft., an affiliate of the Russian mining and metals company Mechel registered in 
2010,80 has decided to limit its local engagement to selling Mechel’s rolled products to 
Hungarian customers. 
• Machinery: There are two major Russian capital-related projects operating in 
Hungary.81 In 2008, Ganz Machinery Works Holding Zrt. started a joint venture with 
its Russian state-owned partner Transportno-Tekhnologicheskoye Mashinostroyeniye 
(TTM)82 of Atomenergomash called Ganz Engineering and Energetics Machinery Kft., 
involved, among others, in the manufacture and installation of hydro machines, 
nuclear power station machinery and oil drilling equipment. The company has 
unique knowledge and experience in Central Europe in planning and manufacturing 
of small-series products. Its high-capacity power plant pumps are also in demand in 
the Russian and Ukrainian nuclear industry.83 Another Russian group, 
CTP/Agromash Holding B.V.84 took over Austria’s Vogel & Noot in 2009, including its 
                                                 
79
 Lebhardt, Olivér, “Vasmű tér, végállomás”, Vs.hu, 16 January 2014, http://vs.hu/mega/dunaferr-dunaujvaros-
katasztrofa-riport/. 
80
 It is directly owned via the Netherlands-based Mechel Service Global B.V., an affiliate founded in March 
2009. 
81
 Since its privatisation in 1993, the Russians had always had shareholdings in DKG-East Oil and Gas 
Equipment Manufacturing Zrt. (and its predecessors), a manufacturer of equipment for the oil, gas and 
petrochemical industries. DKG-East is currently in the hands of Hungary’s Olajterv Group. Meanwhile, not 
only have the owners of DKG-East changed, but so have the target markets of its products. 
82
 In 2010, TTM was replaced by Tsentralnoye Konstruktorskoye Byuro Mashinostroyeniya (TsKBM). TsKBM is 
owned by Atomenergomash, which is owned by Atomenergoprom, an affiliate of Russia’s Rosatom State 
Atomic Energy Corporation. TsKBM is a 51% owner of the joint venture. 
83
 http://ganz.info.hu/index.php/en/company/about_the_company. 
84
 Concern Tractor Plants (CTP), the previous parent company, is now part of the Netherlands-registered 
Machinery & Industrial Group N.V. (M&IG; initially it was operating under the name of Concern Tractor 
Plants N.V.), which became the holding company for the former. However, the group is managed by CTP 
being headquartered in Russia. The Netherlands-registered Agromash Holding B.V. also belongs to M&IG. 
M&IG is a leading manufacturer of earthmoving machinery. In 2010, through a debt restructuring, 
Vnesheconombank acquired 100% of M&IG shares but did not obtain control over the company. Most of the 
shares had been held by Mikhail Bolotin.  
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two Hungarian agricultural machinery factories. One of them produces ploughs in 
the city of Mosonmagyaróvár, close to Austria and Slovakia; the other one located in 
the city of Törökszentmiklós in Central Hungary produces cultivators, compact disc 
harrows, subsoilers, packer and rollers. Production started in Mosonmagyaróvár in 
1993, while in Törökszentmiklós in 2008. In machinery distribution, Uraltrak Kft., 
established in 1991, is the only official local dealer of Russia’s Chelyabinsk Tractor 
Plant, a specialist of engineering and production of industrial tractors and engines.  
• Real estate: The interest of Russian players in Hungary’s real estate market is 
palpable, though Hungary is not among the top destinations for residential real-
estate purchases by Russians. Nevertheless, in 2013, Russian citizens were the most 
important non-EU foreigners buying residential real estate in Hungary.85 Zala County 
is the most attractive destination (with special attention to the spa city of Hévíz), 
followed by Budapest.86 
Epitomized by Surgutneftegaz’s attempt to take over Mol, Hungary has also seen both 
divestments and unsuccessful projects by the Russians.87 Russian firms have been 
discouraged, among others, by tax charges, such as the controversial crisis tax (finally 
abolished at the end of 2012), the so-called “Robin Hood” tax on energy firms and the tax 
on public utility pipelines and cables. Still, some investment is on the horizon. One of the 
particularities of these projects that they go beyond the standard definition of OFDI: 
• The extension of the nuclear power plant near Paks, located in Central Hungary, is a 
project mostly based on an intergovernmental agreement, signed in January 2014. 
The Russian state-owned company Rosatom is expected to participate in the design 
and construction of the future fifth and sixth blocks of the plant, and the Russian 
partners will provide a government loan of up to €10 billion to Hungary. VEB will act 
as an agent for the Russian government.88 
                                                 
85
 In contrast, EU citizens are no longer obliged to obtain permit. 
86
 “Özönlenek az oroszok a magyar lakáspiacra? Itt a friss jelentés”, Napi.hu, 8 May 2014, 
http://www.napi.hu/ingatlan/ozonlenek_az_oroszok_a_magyar_lakaspiacra_itt_a_friss_jelentes.580952.html. 
87
 The Hungarian Airlines Malév was under Russian control for three years. It was renationalised in 2010, and 
finally went bankrupt in 2012. 
88
 Two “mothballed” power stations in Eastern Hungary have been taken over by the Russo–Ukrainian 
consortium. 
- 34 - 
Kálmán Kalotay, Andrea Éltető, Magdolna Sass, Csaba Weiner / Russian capital in the 
Visegrád countries 
 
• In a more classical OFDI project, in May 2014, Magnit, Russia’s largest grocery 
retailer announced to build a logistics centre and a transport department, with a fleet 
of 1,000 trucks, in North-Eastern Hungary. But the project has been put on hold due 
to the crisis in Ukraine. Hungary’s geographic location and the agricultural base 
might have played a role in the investment decision. Part of the food supplies would 
come from Hungary, which is not a novelty, because Magnit has already bought food 
products from Hungary. A great advantage of the Záhony area in North-Eastern 
Hungary at the Hungarian–Ukrainian border is that it has broad-gauge lines. Trucks 
carrying products to Magnit from Western Europe are currently going to Russia via 
Belarus.89 The issue of the Záhony area has always been in the forefront of the 
Russo–Hungarian relations. A joint venture aimed at setting up and operating an 
international warehouse and logistics centre in Záhony was established in 2003 but 
it was struck off the register in 2008 after liquidation. Both Slovakia and Hungary 
raised the idea of building of a broad-gauge railway through their countries. 
• One potential large project involving OFDI but also other types of transactions could 
have been the construction of the local section of the South Stream gas pipeline. But 
South Stream was abandoned on 1 December 2014.90 A Hungarian–Russian joint 
venture (South Stream Hungary Zrt.) involving Gazprom was registered in March 
2010.  
                                                 
89 Szakonyi, Péter, “Itt a döntés, óriási orosz cég jön Magyarországra”, Napi.hu, 30 May 2014, 
http://www.napi.hu/magyar_vallalatok/itt_a_dontes_oriasi_orosz_ceg_jon_magyarorszagra.581895.html
; “Záhonyban lesz az orosz Magnit központja”, Origó, 10 June 2014, 
http://www.origo.hu/gazdasag/20140610-zahonyban-lesz-az-orosz-magnit-kozpontja.html. 
90 See “Russia Decision to Drop Pipeline Puts EU in Tough Spot –Update”, Dow Jones Newswires, 2 
December 2014, http://www.capital.gr/dj/news.asp?details=2171008. 
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Table 7. Main Russian investors in Hungary, 2014 
Name of the 
Russian company 
Direct or 
indirect 
investment 
Industry of 
Russian owner 
Activities in 
Hungary 
Hungarian firm 
acquired – present 
firm 
Sberbank Indirect, via 
Austria 
Banking Banking Volksbank Hungary 
Zrt. (now: Sberbank 
Hungary Zrt.) 
Rakhimkulov family Indirect, via 
Cyprus 
Various Investment and asset 
management 
Kafijat Trading and 
Consulting Kft. (now: 
Kafijat Investment and 
Asset Management 
Zrt.)a 
Rakhimkulov family Direct and 
indirect, via 
the UK and 
Cyprus 
Various Investment and asset 
management 
(banking)b 
OTP Bank Nyrt. 
(9%) 
Gazprom Export 
(Russia, 40%) and 
Centrex Hungary 
Zrt.)c (Hungary, 
10%) (Initially: 
Gazprom – 50%) 
Direct and 
indirect, via 
Austria 
Energy and 
banking)d 
Gas intermediationd Joint venture: 
Panrusgáz Hungarian–
Russian Gas Industry 
Rt. (now: Panrusgáz 
Gas Trading Zrt.) 
Ukraine’s ISD, 
controlled by 
Russian investors 
Indirect, first 
via 
Lichtenstein 
and then via 
Cyprus 
Steel production Production of flat-
rolled products 
Dunaferr Danube 
Ironworks Rt. (now: 
ISD Dunaferr Danube 
Ironworks Zrt.) 
Lukoil Indirect, via 
the 
Netherlands 
Oil and gas Retail and wholesale 
of oil products 
Independent, Avanti 
and JET filling stations 
as well as greenfield 
investment (now: 
Lukoil Hungary Kft.), 
but have sold to 
Hungary’s Norm 
Benzinkút Kft. 
Rosatom’s TsKBM 
(Initially: Rosatom’s 
TTM)  
Direct Manufacturer of 
special pumping 
equipment for the 
nuclear power 
industry, research 
centres and other 
industries 
Manufacture and 
installation of hydro 
machines, nuclear 
power station 
machinery and oil 
drilling equipment 
etc. 
Ganz Engineering 
Environmental Kft. 
(Present joint venture: 
Ganz Engineering and 
Energetics Machinery 
Kft.) (51%) 
CTP/Agromash 
Holding B.V., 
Netherlands 
(M&IG N.V., 
Netherlands)e 
Indirect, via 
the 
Netherlands 
through 
Austria 
Agricultural 
machinery 
Production of 
agricultural 
machinery 
Vogel & Noot 
Mezőgépgyár Kft. and 
Vogel & Noot 
Talajtechnika Kft)f 
Gazprom Russia Energy Gas transmissionb Joint venture: South 
Stream Hungary Zrt. 
(50%)g 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
a Family company of the Rakhimkulovs. 
b This refers only to the activity of the particular Hungarian firm. 
c There were changes in the ownership structure of Panrusgáz. Centrex Hungary is an affiliate of the 
Gazprombank-controlled Centrex Europe Energy & Gas AG (Austria). 
d This refers to the activity of Gazprombank. 
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e Vnesheconombank acquired 100% of M&IG shares but did not obtain control over the company. Most of 
the shares had been held by Mikhail Bolotin. 
f UniCredit Bank Austria AG, Austria, took a mortgage over the shares. 
g On 1 December 2014, Russia abandoned the South Stream gas pipeline project. 
 
Russian capital in Slovakia 
Compared with the other Visegrád countries, the analysis of Russian corporate 
strategies in Slovakia is at a nascent stage. To the best knowledge of the authors of this 
paper, no proper case study on their strategies has been prepared so far. The lack of 
such studies can be in part explained by the fact that Russian firms are more reluctant to 
engage in interviews (although it is not fully impossible) (see IMEMO, 2011). The other 
explanation is that Slovak researchers have seen more priority in following the 
strategies of Western MNEs in the process of EU accession than the activities of Russian 
firms. For these reasons, we cannot present a full in-depth analysis of Russian firms in 
Slovakia. 
The identity of Russian investors in Slovakia is only partly known – mostly the big 
household names, such as Gazprom, that has limited activities in the country under the 
name of Vemex Energy, headquartered in the Czech Republic; Lukoil, which entered 
Slovakia in 2007 when it bought ConocoPhillips’ gas stations in various countries,91 
including the Visegrád Four; and Sberbank, which in 2012 acquired Austrian 
Volksbank’s affiliates in seven countries, including the Visegrád Group except Poland. In 
the past, Yukos participated in the privatization of the pipeline company Transpetrol 
(2002); however following its bankruptcy, the Slovak State bought back that share in 
2009. A common thread of these entries into Slovakia was that they were always related 
to large-scale acquisitions, which facilitated instant access to the local market. 
Another mode of entry for Russian companies is the participation in public tenders 
for large-scale construction contracts. These transactions are not FDI per se; however, 
they play an important part in Russian state-owned firms’ internationalization 
strategies. In Slovakia, the most important deal of this type is the nuclear power 
equipment and service export monopoly Atomstroyexport’s participation in the 3rd and 
                                                 
91 As mentioned in the Hungarian case study, too, Lukoil is about to sell its gas stations to another, mostly 
Russia-linked company at the moment of closing this study. 
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4th phases of the reconstruction of the Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant. Russian 
companies were also participating in tenders for the Bohunice Nuclear Power Plant. The 
participation of Russian companies in those bids in Slovakia has been coordinated since 
2012 by Rusatom Overseas, which is a wholly owned affiliate of the State Atomic Energy 
Corporation Rosatom.92 
The lack of information about the majority of Russian companies, often small in size, 
is related to the fact that their reputation is still low in the aftermath of the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops in 1991, and they compensate this special liability of foreignness by 
registering companies under local names, helping them remaining mostly invisible.93 
The identification of Russian firms is further complicated by the fact that many of their 
transactions targeting Slovakia are financed by capital transhipped via the Netherlands, 
Cyprus and Switzerland.94 
 
Challenges for the extant theories  
The main challenge of the emergence of new sources of OFDI for extant theories is to 
strike a balance between preserving their explanative power under the conditions of 
increasing diversity and maintaing their relative simplicity. It would be an easy response 
to create a special theory for each and every new case: one for the Dragon 
multinationals (it already exists, see Matthews, 2002), one for the Russian Eagles (it 
does not yet exist), etc. The limitation of this approach is that such a fragmentation of 
theory would make cross-country (and retroactive, over time) comparisons impossible. 
The explanation for Dragons cannot be transferred to Eagles and vice versa. However, if 
extant paradigms do not develop together with time, they risk becoming extinct theories 
soon. To illustrate evolution over time, let us draw a parallel with trade theory: the idea 
of comparative advantage is almost 200 years old but not yet completely dead despite 
the rise of its competitors. To survive, it needed to expand its purview to factor 
                                                 
92 See “HNClub: Ruský kapitál sa tlačí na Slovensko”, 18 February 2013, http://hn.hnonline.sk/hnclub-
178/hnclub-rusky-kapital-sa-tlaci-na-slovensko-540166. 
93 The authors are grateful to Sonia Ferencikova for drawing their attention to this point. 
94 See “Slovensko samení. Investori z východu striedajú západných”, 25 November 2012, 
http://spravy.pravda.sk/ekonomika/clanok/253102-slovensko-sa-meni-investori-z-vychodu-striedaju-
zapadnych/. 
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movements, and received a big push by the invention of the revealed comparative 
advantage method in the 1960s (Balassa, 1965). 
For OFDI theories, a similar approach would be the most reasonable. The world has 
evidently changed since the times of the creation of the original theories and paradigms; 
the issue is if they contain sufficient flexibility to adjust to new circumstances, such as 
the rise of Russian OFDI, and its growing concentration in the wider Europe. 
Traditional theories of capital endowments and movements such as the Heckscher–
Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) paradigm (Heckscher, 1919; Ohlin, 1933; Samuelson, 1948) 
face a major difficulty in explaining how lower middle-income the Russian Federation is 
on the global top list of OFDI. In principle, Russia should be a capital importer, not a 
capital exporter country. The main reason for the HOS’ limited power of explanation is 
its aggregate macroeconomic approach, which does not for instance consider such 
structural elements as the split of Russia into high and low-income segments, and the 
accumulation of capital by the high-income group, used in part for international 
business expansion (Kalotay, 2008). The same weakness of aggregation, and a wish to 
establish uniform thresholds across countries and time, make it difficult for the IDP 
(Dunning, 1981) too, to explain why Russia’s investment position turns into balance 
(and since 2009 FDI outflows have been exceeding inflows)95 prematurely. 
The Uppsala School (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990; Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 
1975), positing that the internationalization of firms takes place through stages, also 
suffers regarding the international leapfrogging of Russian firms. Firms following the 
Uppsala stages start operating with limited experience and face uncertainty on foreign 
markets; they internationalize via international trade at best. They envisage investing 
abroad gradually. Why this theory does not hold to the majority of Russian firms? 
Because they are not the typical technology-based small upstarts, but mostly giant firms 
deriving large income from natural resources. Among the Russian investor firms in the 
Visegrád region, we have found some technology-based firms (Kaspersky Lab, Sitronics), 
but they are not the dominant ones and even they internationalised very rapidly. In the 
same vein, the Uppsala School applies well to greenfield OFDI but less to the acquisition 
                                                 
95 See UNCTAD data published on-line on 25 June 2014 in conjunction of the launching of the World 
Investment Report 2014. 
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of foreign assets, in which the relative lack of experience is compensated by, at least 
partly, the expertise found in the target firm. 
The OLI paradigm of Dunning (1977) can in principle fit Russian MNEs better. For 
firms to successfully invest abroad, they must possess ownership advantages (O), which 
enables it to invest successfully in a foreign country. The host country must possess 
certain location advantages (L), linked to the firm-specific advantages of the investor. 
Furthermore, the firm in question invests abroad, that is internalizes foreign 
transactions (I) only when it is more profitable than other forms of presence, such as 
exports. The original OLI framework has been extended and modified several times.96 In 
their most updated form by the author (Dunning & Lundan, 2008), ownership 
advantages can be divided into asset-based advantages (Oa) such as cutting-edge 
technologies, marketing prowess or powerful brand names, and transaction-based 
advantages (Ot) such as common governance of assets and interaction with other 
corporate networks). From this, it can be deducted that transaction-based ownership 
advantages are indirectly shaped and influenced by the home-country business 
environment and culture (e.g. the Chinese Guanxi networks). Despite these advances, 
besides papers applying successfully the framework, there have been studies which in 
the case of new MNEs have not found satisfactory results when they applied the OLI 
framework for explaining their emergence (Child & Rodriguez, 2008). The eclectic 
paradigm was also criticized for not explaining FDI from less developed countries to 
developed ones.97 Thus we should ask whether the emergence and presence of Russian 
MNEs in the Visegrád countries can be explained using the OLI framework. 
As for Russian firms’ Oa, it is obvious that their (exclusive) access to raw materials 
and related technical knowledge are very important for their investment in the Visegrád 
countries. In all the four countries, investment in oil- and gas-related activities 
dominates; there is also some steel-production investment. These activities derive Oa 
advantages from the parent companies’ natural-resource-related expertise. Another 
                                                 
96 As Narula (2010) argues, too much extension and sub-categories for the eclectic paradigm can endanger 
the usefulness of the theory. Rugman (2010) also considers the paradigm too eclectic, very broad and 
overdetermined.  
97 Moon and Roehl (2001) suggest an “imbalance theory” for unconventional FDI instead, claiming that a 
firm wants to search for balance between ownership advantages and disadvantages when investing 
abroad.  
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industry performing similarly is that of nuclear energy production: Russian firms are 
already present in Slovakia, and Hungary concluded an agreement about extending its 
nuclear power plant’s capacity with the help of Russian companies – and the Russian 
government. On the other hand, we could find Russian companies, whose competitive 
advantage is very similar to that of developed-country MNEs, in the sense that they are 
based on innovation and R&D activities. We can find even born global companies among 
them, which internationalized very early in the life cycle of the company. The most 
notable case is that of Luxoft (and to a lesser degree of Kaspersky Lab) investing mainly 
in Poland, not only with a market-seeking motive (representative office) but also with an 
efficiency-seeking motive (local lab with exporting activities). We could find only traces 
of acquiring competitive advantages or ownership advantages instead of exploiting 
existing ones (Narula, 2006). Only the case of Sberbank in acquiring an Austrian bank 
together with its affiliates in the Visegrád countries may belong to that category. 
The Oa advantages of Russian firms in Visegrád countries are closely related to their 
Ot advantages. For instance, in almost all cases, the development of business required 
the use of existing business links. The most evident case is that of financial services, in 
which the main motivation of Russian banks investing abroad has been providing 
financial services to locally active, directly or indirectly Russian-owned affiliates. In 
these cases the ownership advantages can be partly related to existing deep contacts 
with these companies at home and providing them similar to home financial solutions – 
though some of these are more characteristic of an evolving market economy 
environment. The effort to use the same practices in a host country can be traced in the 
quasi criminal cases in the Czech Republic. 
The ownership advantages (both Oa and Ot) of Russian firms are reinforced by 
locational advantages, as the locations/countries in question rely almost exclusively on 
certain Russian natural resources. The two types of advantages are interconnected 
through personal, economic, infrastructure and technical networks inherited from the 
CMEA era in the case of hydrocarbons, iron and steel and nuclear energy industries. The 
machinery industry shows a similar interconnection of ownership and locational 
advantages: they are partly related to the production of related equipment, and 
ownership and related locational advantages are based on the same common inherited 
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factors. For technology-based companies, the locational advantages are not specific to 
the Visegrád countries in case they have market-seeking motivations; but they become 
important if they have efficiency-seeking ones: the relatively low wages of highly skilled 
local labour, and similar languages (in the case of the Slavic countries) offer important 
locational advantages. 
The expansion of Russian MNEs in Visegrád countries is similar to other emerging-
country multinationals in the form of relatively high state involvement, either 
transparently or in an indirect way. The term transparently refers to cases when firms 
are majority owned by the Russian State (such as in the case of Gazprom) or enter into 
the host markets through state contracts (such as in the case of the nuclear power 
industry). The term indirect means state influence without any formal link developed. 
Indirect influence can become a norm in state capitalism (Grätz, 2014). The role of 
Russian State and the Russian policy environment in prompting OFDI raises the issue if 
that factor can be assimilated under the Ot factor, or a home-country (H) factor has to be 
added to the OLI legs. State-owned companies obviously possess advantages that 
facilitate their internationalization (such as financial and administrative support). That 
hypothesis can be extended to privately owned firms whose international expansion is 
seen by the State as strategic priority and as a consequence, it is supported by all 
available means. In the case of Russian MNEs active in innovative industries (especially 
ICT-related services), home-country factors play a minor role. State influence is low 
although the Government is still very much interested in the development of these 
industries and companies (Panibratov & Latukha, 2014). The OLIH hypothesis (Kalotay 
& Sulstarova, 2010; Kalotay, 2010) needs to be further tested in the future, both against 
findings on Russian OFDI and OFDI from other emerging markets, also based on state 
capitalism (e.g. China). 
 
Conclusion 
The number of studies on Russian direct investment and the activity of Russian 
multinationals abroad is growing fast as the country is becoming one of the key sources 
of OFDI on the European and global scene. Knowledge about the activities of Russian 
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MNEs in specific locations is however uneven. Relatively little is known about their 
activities in the Central European region. To start filling that gap, this paper has 
described the motives and patterns of Russian investment in the region, finding a broad 
variety of investors in the four Visegrád countries. Certain companies (the technology-
based firms) show characteristics similar to developed-country MNEs, other firms are 
large state-owned and natural-resource-based firms, alike the ones found in other 
emerging countries, and yet others fall under no straightforward categorization (e.g. real 
estate investors). 
The reactions of the Visegrád host Governments to Russian MNEs have been mixed. 
The group of state-owned resource giants has stirred up more concerns about their 
perceived relationship with Russian foreign policy objectives. Additionally, the use of 
transhipment and other tactics to hide the origin of capital by some Russian investors 
has given rise to serious worries in Visegrád countries. Divergences in the attitudes of 
the Visegrád countries can explain the main differences in the presence and activities of 
Russian MNEs in each country analysed. 
This paper has also drawn tentative conclusions on the applicability of international 
business theory to this special case of OFDI, especially as far as Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm in concerned. On the basis of the analysis of the Visegrád countries, it has been 
found that the main elements of the OLI paradigm can be applied when explaining 
Russian FDI there, but its extensions with home-country factors seem to be necessary. 
This refers first of all to MNEs in natural-resource-based industries, mainly oil, gas and 
steel; but home-country interest is prevalent in other industries, too. 
To validate the results of this paper, further research on Russian OFDI in the four 
Visegrád countries is necessary in the future. Moreover, in order to compare these 
conclusions with the findings of studies on Russian firms in similar geographical areas, it 
is also imperative to investigate patterns of Russian investment in other EU countries. 
The analysis of the activities and motivations of Russian MNEs in turn need be compared 
with the behaviour of other emerging-market MNEs. In this respect, it is already possible 
to count on studies on Chinese MNEs which, to some extent, seem to reinforce the idea 
of home-country influence (see Wei et al., 2014); yet other studies re-confirm the 
importance of EU countries in the global strategies of Chinese firms (see for example, 
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Ebbers & Zhang, 2010; Spigarelli, 2012). The task is to weave these strands of literature 
together to arrive to a more coherent explanation of activities of emerging-market 
MNEs. 
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